Appendix J

Regulatory Inspection History

TECHNICAL SAFETY BC

Inspection History Appendix

Timeline:

Installed – 2000, acceptance inspection at that time. Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MMA) inspector at that time identified issues with carriers not entering the station smoothly and requested improvements.

January 2001 – MMA Required the development of written procedure for use during high wind situations including to monitor winds at the top station.

May 2001 – MMA Non-compliance indicated that drive and return stage guideage had to be adjusted to ensure decelerating cabins did not hang up or interface with the guides.

May 2005 – BCSA SO stated “Obtain welding repair procedure for first incoming support bracket (c bracket) for lateral rail at drive station. Repair shall be conducted in accordance with Leitner Poma procedure and specified time frame. Bracket shall be monitored regularly during operation and any further deterioration shall be reported to the BCSA. Additional non-compliance stated “Contact Leitner Poma to confirm that damaged hanger arm on carrier #44 is acceptable for further use. Obtain repair procedures for hanger head gusset if necessary. This hanger shall be non destructively tested prior to operation for passengers. In addition, a non compliance stated “Procedures for operations in high winds shall be modified to reflect the following: carrier monitoring for drive station entry in windy conditions shall be conducted at the drive arrival pedestal or at the machine room arrival side control panel, when wind conditions warrant constant monitoring or offloading of passengers cabin position at station entry shall be monitored by competent maintenance personnel, lift operators may stop the installation until maintenance staff arrive when necessary. Please submit a copy of these procedures to the BCSA.” Additional reference to a June 22, 2005 carrier incident at the drive station.

November 2006 – BCSA Safety Officer requested the KHMR “Consult with Leitner Poma to determine if modifications are required to the drive station incoming rail and guidage [sic] systems to prevent wind related carrier incidents. Consideration shall be given to the primary and lateral rails as discussed. There are a total of 5 wind related carrier incidents at the drive station on file for this installation two of which have caused haul rope damage.”

December 6, 2007 - BCSA non compliance stated to “Complete installation on extension to entrance rail (trumpet rail) as per manufacturer’s bulletin.” An additional non-compliance required the repair of cracked welds on the entrance beam main axle frame on both the drive and return stations.

February 2008 – BCSA non compliance noted that both previous non compliances related to carrier impacts and the structure were not yet resolved as they were still listed.

January 2015 – BCSA SO stated “Contact the manufacturer to obtain instructions for continue operation and repair procedure for cracks discovered in the drive station incoming lateral rail. Provide photos and measurements of these cracks to the manufacturer to ensure the proper repair procedure is prescribed. Monitor cracks daily until repairs have been completed. Provide to the BC Safety Authority manufacturer’s recommendations for continuing to operate the Gondola. Provide the BC Safety Authority the manufacturer’s repair procedure.” Notes in the accompanying email indicated these cracks appeared to have been caused by swinging gondola cabins.

November 2017 – TSBC SO notes state “Observed lift operating from drive station. There is indications of improper contact of carriers/station on the uphill side. Maintenance staff was in process of adjusting the station setup at time of inspection.”

January 2020 – TSBC SO observed that gondola cabins were dragging through the snow at the load station.